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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the determination of inflation expectations. 
The following two questions are examined: How much do 
inflation expectations reflect different economic and institutional 
regime shifts and in which way do inflation expectations adjust to 
past inflation? The basic idea in the analysis is an assumption that 
inflation expectations do not mechanically reflect past inflation as 
may econometric specification de facto assume but rather they 
depend on the relevant economic regime. Also the adjustment of 
expectations to past inflation is different in different inflation 
regimes. The regime analysis is based on panel data from 
EMU/EU countries for the period 1973–2004, while the inflation 
adjustment analysis mainly uses the Kalman filter technique for 
individual countries for the same period. Expectations (forecasts) 
are derived from OECD data. Empirical results strongly favour the 
regime-sensitivity hypothesis and provide an explanation for the 
poor performance of conventional estimation procedures in the 
context of Phillips curves 
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This paper deals with inflation expectations. Put very simply we want to examine the ques-
tion of how sensitive inflation expectations are in terms of different economic regimes. For 
regimes, we consider some basic institutional regimes like the EMU membership. But 
above all, we are interested in the role of different inflation regimes. Then relevant ques-
tion is whether inflation expectations are invariant to these regimes (or more precisely, 
whether the way in which inflation expectations respond to past inflation stays the same in 
different inflation regimes). 
  The role of inflation expectation is crucial in modelling and explaining changes in ac-
tual inflation. Concretely this shows up in the context of Phillips curves. The problem is 
that in this context we have not been very successful and this is true both in general and in 
particular concerning the role of inflation expectations (see e.g. Zhu (2005) and Linzert 
(2005) and Tillman (2005)). When we deal with inflation expectations we usually mean 
expected future values of inflation that is constructed by means of the (orthogonality con-
ditions of) GMM. This way of constructing inflation expectations has its obvious short-
comings, especially because it postulates a quite mechanical relationship between expected 
inflation and past inflation and, in addition, past values of some (usually quite few) other 
variables. Thinking about other relevant variables which may characterize the inflationary 
environment and the Central Bank’s ability and willingness to control inflation this ap-
proach might well be quite deficient and that in turn might explain the relatively poor per-
formance of Phillips curves. 
 
This is why we in this paper try to shed some light on question of how much measured in-
flation expectations or forecasts seem to reflect things other that past inflation, and to 
which the extent they just reflect past inflation. In terms of the latter channel, the interest-
ing question is has this relationship changed over time, or over different inflation regimes. 
“The other things” here mean various policy regimes or environments such as the EMU 
membership. When we focus on the “inflation regimes” and the possible variance of ex-
pected inflation past actual inflation relationship we mainly think about the high inflation 
regime in the 1970s and the subsequent steps towards lower inflation in the 1980s and 
1990s 
 
A lot of work has already been done in establishing the effect of monetary policy regimes 
in inflation expectations (see e.g. Andolfatio and Gomme 2003 and Rocketts and Rose 
1995). Besides showing that certain differences do exist they have provided a rationaliza-
tion to the fact the rational expectations hypothesis based on direct measures of inflation 
expectations from surveys is typically rejected. More specifically, the reason is the so-
called ex post bias which follows from the fact agents incorporate the possibility of a re-
gimes change into their expectations
1.  
                                                 
1 Alternatively, one might the “near rational model of expectations” to explain the persistence of inflation and 
also poor performance of New Keynesian Phillips curves (cf. Ball 2000 and Akerlof and Yellen 1985).   2 
  As a practical tool we use the time-variant adaptive expectations rule originally pro-
posed by Stephen Turnovsky in 1969 which easily allows for time-variant parameter esti-
mates with the Kalman filter technique. 
  The whole analysis makes use of inflation (and output) forecasts made by the OECD. 
Although some alternative sources of inflation forecasts do exist (see e.g. Mankiw, Reis 
and Wolfers (2003) and Adam and Padula (2004)) OECD forecasts are superior in the 
sense that they cover all industrialized countries in the same way and, moreover, they also 
facilitate the follow-up the inflation up-dating procedure. In other words, we can instead of 
the most recent (2005) inflation numbers use the so-called real-time data which corre-
sponds the most recent inflation estimate of actual inflation that forecasters have had in 
making assessments on future inflation. 
 
 
2 Analytical  framework 
When analyzing the role different regimes we follow a quite straightforward way in track-
ing the regime effects. That is, we fit the following simple dummy regression into the data. 
 
it ijt j j i
e
it u D a a p + + = ∑ + 0 1  (2.1) 
 
where i is the index for the country, j for the regime (dummy) and t for the time period. 
The dummies represent such things as: adoption of formal inflation target, change in Cen-
tral Banks legislation, depreciation or appreciation of currency, (major) change in financial 
markets which in practice means various steps in liberalizating credit (and foreign ex-
change) controls, (major) fiscal stabilization efforts (packages) and various institution re-
gime indicators (EU membership, EMS and ERM membership and, finally, the EMU 
membership). The corresponding data are collected from the OECD Economic Outlook, 
from the OECD country surveys, and from various policy reviews from individual coun-
tries (published by the ministries of finance and the central banks). The model is estimated 
from panel data which cover the period 1972–2004 and using OECD forecasts for 
e
t p  (Ta-
ble 1). 
  In addition to regime dummies, we use some ex-post data for fiscal balances and im-
port prices to assess their importance as indicators of different fiscal and inflation regimes 
(Table 2). This is partly motivated by the fact that in the analysis of regime indicators 
(dummies) it clearly shows up that these variables cannot really explain the change of in-
flation expectations during the two oil crises in 1974 and 1979/1980. As for the fiscal indi-
cators, we want to use also actual data in distinguishing (possible) fiscal regimes. The data 
which we otherwise have are (non-quantitative) data for pronounced fiscal stabilization 
programs which may obviously tell more on fiscal stabilization problems than successful 
fiscal policy. It might be tempting to think that the performance of fiscal variables might 
also shed some light on the relevance of the “fiscal theory of inflation” but obviously this 
is not way the theory could be tested.  3 
  As a separate exercise we scrutinize the relationship between OECD inflation and out-
put growth forecasts. More precisely, we want to see whether the corresponding forecast 
errors reflect some form of Phillips curve. In practice, this analysis boils down in estimat-
ing the following relationship in a panel data set- up for 15 EU countries for the sample 
period 1973–2004 
 
u ) y y ( * p p
e e + − α = −  (2.2) 
 
The corresponding results are reported in Table 3 and in Figure 2. 
  As for the inflation regime analysis, we proceed as follows. We examine the relation-
ship between inflation forecasts and past (observed) inflation using the following adaptive 
expectations formula as a starting point 
 




− − − θ = ∆  (2.3) 
 
where p denotes the rate of inflation p
e being the corresponding forecast value. 
  In an old (classical) paper Turnovsky (1969) shows that it is now point of assuming θ 
constant. Instead, one may use the idea of Bayesian “learning” in a cross-section setting to 
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where ω denotes the subjective variance associated to the average price level. It can be 











2 is the variance of individual prices and n the number 
of markets (goods). 
  Clearly, the coefficient of “adaptive expectations” parameter does not stay constant 
unless the sampling procedure of the decision maker (forecaster) satisfies some quite strict 





, i.e. the pre-
cision of the estimate of the price level is extremely low, we end up with simple static ex-
pectations’ rule where  1 t
e
t p p − = . By contrast, full inertia in expectations results when 
σ
2 = ∞ and one cannot improve the initial estimate of ω (except for investing infinite 
amount of resources to the sampling procedure). 
  Now if one just focuses prices and inflation (and ignores all other relevant information) 
we may expect that that expected inflation react to past inflation quite differently in differ-
ent regimes (which basically differ in terms of the relative variances of relative and aggre-
gate prices). Thus, in the high-inflation regime of the 1970s θ may we be close to 1 while 
in the current “no inflation” regime θ is zero. 
  Technically, the problem could be solved by using the Kalman filter in estimating the 
adaptive expectations scheme (2.1) and acknowledging that the evolvement of θ depends 
on the respective signal-noise ratio.  4 
 
 
A simple way to test this hypothesis is to estimate a threshold model in which the coeffi-
cient θ in equation (2.3) is made conditional to the inflation regime. Thus, we may estimate 
a threshold value for inflation rate which divides the sample to “low inflation” and “high 
inflation” sub-samples. Given these threshold values we get the corresponding adjustment 
parameter θ values and may test whether the updating equation (3) is indeed linear across 
inflation regimes (see Hansen (1999) and (2000) for details of the methodology in a panel 
setting). A representative set of estimates is presented in Table 4 below.  
 
A bit more sophisticated way to solve the problem is to use the Kalman filter in estimating 
the adaptive expectations scheme (2.3) and to acknowledge that the evolvement of θ de-
pends on the respective signal-noise ratio  
 
  Then the estimating model is of the following form 
 
ε + =








) p p ( * g p
 (2.5) 
 
where change in the (expected) inflation now represents the signal and the coefficient of 
the forecast error the state. µ and ε are both assumed Gaussian and contemporaneously un-
correlated. µ represent a shock on inflation expectations while ε represent a shock on the 






can compute the filter. Here, in the same way is in Edge, Laubach and Williams (2004), we 
use not only the actual data but also the real-time data, in computing the forecast errors. 
 Time-variant  θ parameter can estimated more easily in a panel-data context by just fit-




− − − θ = ∆ , i =  1973,…,2004, into the 
data. Results from these analyses are reported in Figures 3–4. Kalman filter estimates are 
reported in Table 5 and Figures 5–11. The figures represent both average values for all EU 
countries and individual country results. As for individual country results, the case of 




Turn first to the result with regime dummies. The results in Table 1 quite clearly show that 
they can in a reasonable way explain the changes in inflation expectations. This is true 
even in the case the models include annual dummies which presumably take into account 
changes in overall inflationary environment. The dummies seem mainly to reflect two oil 
shocks and subsequent high inflation periods (see Figure 1) which obviously cannot be 
controlled by our regime dummies.  5 
  As for individual dummies, we find that all perform in a meaningful way irrespectively 
of the estimation method and data transformations. Thus, inflation targeting and strength-
ening of central bank position in control of inflation seem to lower inflation expectations. 
Developments in exchange rates seem to be even more important in this respect. Obviously 
this may simply reflect the direct pass-through of import prices as a consequence of depre-
ciation/appreciation of exchange rates. But equally well it may reflect the changes in 
monetary policy credibility. In the environment in which exchange rate targeting repre-
sented the dominating policy rule failures in preserving the target must have had some ef-
fect in anticipations on future monetary policy developments. 
  Financial market reforms do not seem to affect very strongly on inflation expectations, 
or maybe the effect is a sum some conflicting tendencies. Reforms have created more effi-
cient and transparent markets but also, at least in the short run, created some inflationary 
pressure due to asset price increase (which was often characterized as bubbles). 
  As for different “membership” dummies, we find that membership in the European 
Union has not been particularly important although it has a quite systematically negative 
effect on inflation expectations. In this respect, memberships in the EMS/ERM and EMU 
have been more important – at least in the sense their effects can be estimated more pre-
cisely. 
  Finally, turn to the effects of so-called fiscal stabilization programs. At face value, one 
might imagine they affect inflation expectations in “a correct way” (lower expected infla-
tion”). The data tells a different story. An obvious explanation is a “sample selection bias” 
type effect which is due to the fact that fiscal stabilizations were needed only in the case 
fiscal balance had either been lost or there has been a great danger of loosing the balance. 
Of course, fiscal stabilization efforts could have been useful from the perspective of infla-
tion control (in the case fiscal problems do exist) compared with the alternative of “do 
nothing”. Still the (overall) effect which obtained here may tell that the fiscal programs 
have not been very effective in general. 
  The considerations give a good reason to look the effects of (measured) true fiscal bal-
ance on inflation expectations. Results form this analysis are reported in Table 2. In the 
estimating equation we have also import prices mainly to control the development in oil 
prices. The results represent really no surprise; better fiscal balance seems lower expecta-
tions on future inflation. 
  Before we turn to analysis on the role of past inflation we shortly scrutinize the rela-
tionship between expected inflation and expected output growth. The results from this 
analysis which in precise terms concerns the relationship between the respective forecast 
errors (with different time horizons) are reported in Table 3 and Figure 2. The somewhat 
surprising result is the fact these two forecast errors seem to negative correlated (except for 
a long – two years’ – time horizon). The result is somewhat puzzling from the Phillips 
curve point of view and cannot be simply explained. One important point is the fact that 
correlation between the forecast errors is after all relative small (of the magnitude of 0.01–
0.04 measured by the R
2 of the estimated equation) which suggests that forecast errors are 
to large extent variable-specific and reflect difference sources of effects. 
  Next we turn to the analysis of inflation regimes which in practice means estimating 
the adaptive expectations formulas (2.2) and (2.3). (2.2) was estimated panel data using  6 
time-variant coefficients of lagged inflation forecast errors (see Figures 3 and 4). Equation 
(2.3), in turn, is estimated in a cross-country panel set-up with a threshold model and in a 
single country equation framework with the simple Kalman filter representation.  
 
The results of both analyses point to same direction: parameter θ has clearly decreased 
over time.
2 If one tests the constancy of the coefficients of lagged inflation forecast errors 
(equation 2.3) the relevant F statistic turns out to be 1.76 which corresponds to the 4.4 per 
cent critical value. With the threshold model the equality of coefficients below and above 
the threshold is clearly rejected by the data (see the Wald test statistics in Table 4). Thus 
below the 4 per cent threshold (which minimized the sum of squares function) the value of 
θ is of the magnitude of 0.5 or 0.6 while above the threshold (in the “high inflation” re-
gime) it is close to one. Introducing an additional threshold did not make much difference. 
Anyway, the closer one comes to zero inflation the lower become the updating coefficient. 
By contrast, if one goes beyond 4 per cent beyond, say, 10 per cent, that changes the θ co-
efficient only marginally
3. All of that obviously shows up in calendar time. Thus, while in 
the mid 1970 the coefficient seems to have been close to one now it is decreased, if not to 
zero, but to 0.5, or below that. In the 1970s the mechanism of inflation expectations was 
close to regressive expectations in which expected inflation is just a reflection of past infla-
tion. Now we have turned to a system in which – according to the Kalman filtering results - 
past inflation is less important, and in some cases even of zero importance.  
     This is true especially in the case long (two-year) forecast horizon. Then, as shown in 
Figures 8 and 9, the θ coefficient goes almost to zero. The corresponding data cover the 
period 1990-2004 only so that we really distinguish the consequences of longer time hori-
zon and low inflation regime. Anyway, we may safely conclude that the role past inflation 
is currently completely different from what it was in the 1970 and early 1980s
4.  
     Basically this is no surprise; if inflation settles down to the proximity of the inflation 
target level variations of past inflation are not very informative in predicting future devel-
opments.
5 For the sake of future developments, other things, like overall policy credibility, 
perceived effectiveness of policy and policy uncertainty may be more important.  
 
 
                                                 
2 The decline of the θ parameter is not monotonic as can be seen from figures 10-11. Thus, for instance, in 
the case of Germany the parameter starts to increase again in about 1990 (Figure 7). This may be explained 
by German unification but it is not all clear whether this is the (whole) explanation. Similar changes appear 
in many other countries as well and also Figure 1 indicates that at this point of data inflation expectation ex-
perience a sudden increase (which by the way cannot be explained by exchange rate depreciation and appre-
ciation dummies).  
3 The two-threshold case is here more of illustrative nature than of a final result (thus it does not represent a 
minimum of a sum of squares function). Setting two thresholds is already a bit complicated issue as pointed 
out by Hansen (1999).  
4 If one estimates a panel data model of (2.3) for this short period with the two-year inflation forecast variable 
the estimates of coefficient θ vary between 0.051 and 0.156 (the lowest value coming from SUR estimation 
with real-time inflation data and the highest with GLS estimation with actual inflation data).    
5 This is a bit similar thing than the gold standard before the first Wold War. Then price level was more or 
less stationary and inflation could not be properly forecast. Accordingly, the Fisher equation does not seem to 
perform very well for this period. See e.g. Barsky (1987) for details. To rationalize these results we might use 
the Akerlof and Yellen (1985) "near rational model of expectations" in which agents do not react to small 
deviations of price changes.   7 
 
 
4 Concluding  remarks 
 
This analysis has showed that one should careful in treating inflation expectations in me-
chanical way as reflections of past values of inflation or more generally past values of 
typical set of macro variables. The formation of inflation expectations is probably sensitive 
to different policy regimes and there identification of these regimes becomes important. It 
is also important both because of interpretation of the data and because of assessment of 
the nature of inflation expectations (e.g. from the point of view of rational expectations). 
An idea of single inflation expectations regime is appealing but it has never really been 
under careful testing which it definitely deserves.  
 
These considerations suggest that efforts in rescuing the currently standard New Keynesian 
Phillips curve by, for instance, introducing more dynamics, may not be very successful. 
One may able to get reasonable ex-post predictive power to the Phillips curve but that may 
not translate to equally good en ante predictive power.  Irrespectively of question what is 
the right remedy it seems well-founded to put more effort in examining the propagation 
mechanism of inflation expectations because it is surely much more complicated than what 
most econometric models implicitly or explicitly assume.   8 
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Table 1.   Testing the impact of regime-change dummies 
 




















































































































































DW  1.07  0.47 1.33 0.68 0.55  2.01 
Estimator SUR  GLS,  CSFE  SUR  GLS  GLS,TSFE  SUR 
Dummies impulse  impulse  permanent  permanent  permanent  impulse 
The dependent variable in equations 1–5 is the OECD forecast for next year’s inflation. In equation 6, it is 
the difference between inflation forecasts for the current year (published in this year’s December and the pre-
vious year’s December). Equations 1 and 3 are estimated by SUR and equation 2 with GLS using the fixed 
effects specification. The number of data points is 335. Numbers inside parentheses are corrected t-values. 
The dummies are either expressed as impulse (0, 1) dummies or permanent (1) values from certain period 




Table 2.   Testing the impact of government deficits and 
     import  prices 
 
Dependent variables   1  2  3  4 


































DW 1.47  2.18  1.88  2.58 
Form of data   level  difference  level  difference 
Positive values of deficit represents surplus. The dependent variable is (the difference of OECD December) 
inflation forecast for the next year. The number of data points is 189. All estimates are (cross-section) SUR 
estimates (with no fixed effects). 
 
 
Table 3.   Relationship between inflation and output growth 
     forecast  errors 
 
Forecast horizon   Data   OLS  GLS  SUR 




























































Numbers are the coefficient estimates of output growth forecast errors (with different time horizons). The 
data consist of 423 observations for D1, J2 and S2, 314 for J2 and 228 for D3. Corrected t-values are inside 
parentheses. S1 denotes the forecast published in OECD December Economic Outlook the current year, S2 
forecast for the next and S3 forecast for two years ahead. Similarly K1 and K2 correspond to forecasts pub-
lished in OECD June Economic Outlook.  11
 
Table 4 Threshold model estimates for the inflation updating equation (3) 
 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 






















θ| ∆p<2        .495 
(9.05) 
θ| 2≥∆p<10        .857 
(19.11) 
θ| ∆p≥10        1.031 
(22.22) 
R2  0.645  0.527 0.636 0.687 0.619 0.500 
SEE  1.438  0.997 1.447 1.444 1.447 0.976 
DW  1.807  1.934 1.977 1.975 1.909 1.916 
Wald  20.34  65.08 16.27 16.21 19.29 27.83 
Estimator   GLS  SUR  OLS, FE  GLS, FE  GLS, RE  SUR 
Numbers inside parentheses are corrected t-values. All equations are estimated with OECD December infla-
tion forecast for the following year. FE (RE) indicates the fixed (random) effects specification. The Wans-
beek-Kapteyn estimator is used for the RE model. Wald indicates a F test statistic for the hypothesis θ|∆p<4 
= θ|∆p≥4. The number of data points in all equations is 434.  
  12
Table 5.   Results from Kalman filter estimation 
 
    Dec, R  Dec, H  June, R  June, H  Dec, D 
AUT  Var(µ) 0.84 0.33 0.56 0.38  0.54 
    3.53 2.93 2.66 3.52  3.81 
  gT  0.32 0.96 0.14 0.56  0.75 
    0.78 2.47 0.39 1.54  1.97 
          
BEL  Var(µ) 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.83  0.42 
    4.08 5.82 5.16 4.83  3.77 
  gT  0.57 0.51 0.60 0.75  0.63 
    1.59 1.40 1.76 1.93  1.77 
          
DEN  Var(µ) 2.06 1.54 0.76 0.65  1.97 
    4.75 4.94 4.41 4.19  5.21 
  gT  0.79 0.71 0.24 0.25  0.87 
    1.72 1.65 0.67 0.70  1.84 
          
FIN  Var(µ) 2.58 2.45 0.54 0.51  1.99 
    5.25 6.08 3.14 3.09  4.82 
  gT  0.66 0.62 0.40 0.41  0.90 
    1.75 1.55 1.42 1.40  2.36 
          
FRA  Var(µ) 0.74 0.83 0.42 0.54  0.80 
    3.95 3.26 3.78 3.75  4.62 
  gT  1.07 0.98 0.88 0.72  1.12 
    2.50 2.30 2.18 1.81  2.55 
          
GER  Var(µ) 0.59 0.56 0.43 0.43  0.46 
    3.33 3.40 2.74 3.01  2.81 
  gT  0.44 0.41 0.54 0.56  0.51 
    1.10 1.11 1.57 1.67  1.35 
          
GRE  Var(µ) 5.39 4.57      5.62 
   7.03  4.75      6.26 
  gT 0.76  1.18     0.60 
   1.66  2.51      1.29 
          
IRL  Var(µ) 3.17 1.91 1.51 0.88  3.14 
    4.71 4.15 4.27 5.50  4.72 
  gT  0.45 0.75 0.26 0.69  0.61 
    1.18 1.83 0.85 1.92  1.59 
          
ITA  Var(µ) 3.95 2.65 2.12 1.66  4.29 
    5.10 4.44 3.59 2.85  5.26 
  gT  0.84 0.86 0.74 0.81  0.95 
    1.87 2.01 1.75 2.04  2.00 
           13
Table 5 continued 
LUX  Var(µ) 0.34 0.30 0.50 0.37  0.31 
    3.14 2.34 4.91 4.97  3.40 
  gT  0.56 0.68 0.42 0.52  0.71 
    1.69 1.99 1.34 1.59  2.16 
          
NET  Var(µ) 0.91 0.66 0.58 0.44  0.95 
    3.87 3.99 3.10 3.84  3.88 
  gT  0.76 0.81 0.32 0.38  0.78 
    1.71 2.10 0.91 1.22  1.79 
          
POR  Var(µ) 3.93 2.21 2.68 2.52  3.94 
    4.19 3.38 4.17 4.80  4.51 
  gT  0.75 1.00 0.56 0.70  0.77 
    1.75 2.39 1.46 1.75  1.80 
          
SPA  Var(µ) 3.62 1.84 1.01 1.05  3.46 
    6.01 4.90 4.33 4.80  6.25 
  gT  0.87 1.09 0.13 0.26  0.84 
    1.85 2.46 0.33 0.64  1.83 
          
SWE  Var(µ) 4.14 4.52 2.71 2.64  4.01 
    5.73 5.49 6.01 6.25  5.99 
  gT  0.73 0.80 0.18 0.28  0.85 
    1.57 1.66 0.44 0.69  1.79 
          
UK  Var(µ) 5.10 4.17 0.38 0.35  3.97 
    6.50 6.71 2.94 3.50  6.42 
  gT  0.61 0.58 0.28 0.28  0.86 
    1.31 1.36 1.07 1.05  1.85 
          
Var(p) denotes the estimated variance of the signal equation and gT the final estimate of the state variable. t-
ratios are below the parameter estimates. The actual rate of inflation is computed either by using the histori-
cal ex-post (H) rate of inflation or the corresponding real-time (R) rate which corresponds to the December 
estimate of the previous year’s inflation. The estimates in the last column refer to the signal equation in 
which is the actual rate is replaced OECD December forecast for the current year’s rate of inflation (D). 
  14
Figures 1–11 
Figure 1.  Time variant constant term from the regime 
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      Both errors are related to OECD December forecasts for 
     the  next  year. 
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Figure 3.  Time-variant θ θ θ θ-parameter from panel regression 













      Actual inflation is computed from ex-post (2005) data on 
      consumer prices. Inflation forecasts are OECD December 
      forecasts for the next year. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Time-variant θ θ θ θ-parameter from panel regression 













      Actual real-time inflation corresponds to the OECD 
      December data on previous year’s consumer price inflation. 
      Inflation forecasts are OECD December forecasts for the 
     next  year.  16
Figure 5.  EU-averages of the smoothed Kalman filter 



















      s2 (k2) denotes the OECD December (June) forecast for 
      the next year. pc denotes the actual ex-post (2005) inflation 
      rate, pcd the OECD real-time estimate of it and pe1 the 
      OECD December forecast for the current year’s inflation. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Median EU values of the smoothed Kalman filter 





















Figure 7.  Smoothed Kalman filter estimates of the 


















Figure 8.  Smoothed Kalman filter estimates of the θ θ θ θ-parameters for 

















Values are final (end of period) estimates of the state variable, i.e. the 
θ parameter. In most cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they 
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Figure 9.  EU-average of smoothed Kalman filter estimates of the θ θ θ θ-
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